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National Courts of Last Instance Failing to
Make a Preliminary Reference: The (Possible)
Consequences Flowing Therefrom
Morten BROBERG*
According to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
Member State courts may – and sometimes must – refer questions on the interpretation or
validity of EU legal measures to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a binding
preliminary ruling. But what are the consequences if a Member State court fails to make a
preliminary reference in a situation where it was legally obliged to do so? The article shows that
such failure may constitute an infringement of the right to a fair trial as laid down in Article
6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights. It may also form the basis for a claim for
damages under EU law. Moreover, it may instigate the European Commission to institute
infringement proceedings against the Member State in question. Finally, in some situations, a
failure to make a preliminary reference may affect the validity of the Member State court’s
judgment, and there may also be a requirement on Member State administrative authorities to
reopen the case file if, after the ruling by the Member State court, it becomes apparent that this
court erred with regards to EU law.
1 INTRODUCTION
On 8 April 2014, the European Court of Human Rights rendered its ruling in
Dhahbi v. Italy.1 The case concerned the question whether a national court of one
of the EU Member States could be held to have infringed Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights on the right to a fair trial if the national
court declined to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the
European Union without giving proper reasons for this. In the Dhahbi case, The
European Court of Human Rights ruled that there had been such violation.
* Professor of law and Jean Monnet Chair-holder, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law. Contact
details: Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Studiegaarden, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455
Copenhagen, Denmark, Morten.Broberg@jur.ku.dk, The author is very grateful to his friend and
colleague, Professor Niels Fenger, for his substantive assistance in the writing of the present article.
Needless to say, all views and any remaining fallacies shall be attributed to the author only.This article
was accepted for publication on 8 July 2015. Developments that occur after this date are not taken
into account.
1 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 8 Apr. 2014, Dhahbi v. Italy, Application No.
17120/09, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-142504.
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Taking the ruling in the Dhahbi case as point of departure, this article provides
an overview of the legal consequences that may flow from a national court of one
of the Member States failing to make a preliminary reference. The topic is first
examined from the perspective of the European Convention of Human Rights
(section 2). Next, the possibility of claiming damages under EU law is examined
(section 3).The possibility of the European Commission instituting infringement
proceedings against a Member State if courts of that State fail to refer is also
considered (section 4). Thereupon, the article examines the possibility of the
national ruling being rendered invalid, a duty for Member State administrative
authorities to reopen the case, and whether there may be a duty on a court of last
instance to re-refer (section 5). Finally, the article seeks to provide the full picture
by tying the different knots together.
2 FAILURE TO REFERANDARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The question of whether a national court’s failure to make a preliminary reference
constitutes a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights
has arisen on several occasions; both with regards to references from Member State
courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union and with regards to some of
the national jurisdictions where the lower (national) courts can (or must) submit
certain questions to superior (national) courts. Thus, in Coëme, the European
Court of Human Rights was asked to consider whether the Belgian Court of
Cassation had committed an infringement of Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights when it refused to make a preliminary reference to
the Belgian ‘Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court’ on certain issues
relating to the main proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights first
observed that the European Convention on Human Rights does not, as such,
guarantee any right to have a case referred by a domestic court to another national
or international authority for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, it observed that
there was no absolute right to have a preliminary question referred to a court.This
was so even where a particular field of law may be interpreted only by a court
designated by statute and where the legislation concerned requires other courts to
refer to that court, without reservation, all questions relating to that field. The
European Court of Human Rights added, however, that ‘it is not completely
impossible that, in certain circumstances, refusal by a domestic court trying a case
at final instance [to make a preliminary reference] might infringe the principle of
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fair trial, as set forth in Article 6 §1 of the Convention, in particular where such
refusal appears arbitrary’.2
The reasoning in the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Coëme also
applies to a national court’s failure to make preliminary references to the Court of
Justice of the European Union.3 Thus, in Canela Santiago v. Spain, the European
Court of Human Rights held that the Spanish Supreme Court’s failure to make a
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice did not constitute an infringement of
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights because the Supreme
Court had set out its reasons for not making a preliminary reference so that the
refusal to make a preliminary reference could not be regarded as arbitrary.4 And in
Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek, the European Court of Human Rights held that
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights imposes an obligation
on the national courts to give reasons for any decision refusing to refer a question,
particularly where the applicable law permits such a refusal only on an exceptional
basis.The European Court of Human Rights went on to observe that with regards
to ‘national courts against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law,
which refuse to refer to the Court of Justice [of the European Union] a
preliminary question on the interpretation of [EU] law that has been raised before
them, are obliged to give reasons for their refusal in the light of the exceptions
provided for in the case law of the Court of Justice [of the European Union]’.5
Indeed, in the Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek ruling, the European Court of
Human Rights went on to observe:
that the [European Court of Human Rights] does not rule out the possibility that, where
a preliminary reference mechanism exists, refusal by a domestic court to grant a request for
such a referral may, in certain circumstances, infringe the fairness of proceedings – even if
that court is not ruling in the last instance . . . The same is true where the refusal proves
arbitrary …, that is to say where there has been a refusal even though the applicable rules
allow no exception to the principle of preliminary reference or no alternative thereto,
2 Coëme and others v Belgium ECHR 2000-VII, para. 114, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59194. See also the two unreported decisions to which the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights refers in para. 114 in Coëme, as well as Wynen and Centre
Hospitalier Interrégional Edith-Cavell v Belgium ECHR 2002-VIII, paras 41–3, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60725 and Ernst and others v. Belgium, Ap-
plication No. 33400/96, decision of 15 Jul. 2003, paras 74–6, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-65779.
3 John v. Germany, decision on admissibility of 13 Feb. 2007 (No. 15073/03), available at http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-79763.
4 Canela Santiago v. Spain, Application No. 60350/00, decision of 4 Oct. 2001, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-43054. See also M. Breuer, State Liability for
Judicial Wrongs, 29 Eur. L. Rev. 243, 251 (2004); and H. Schermers & D. Waelbroeck, Judicial
Protection in the European Union (2001), 272.
5 Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium, Application Nos 3989/07 and 38353/07, decision of 20 Sep.
2011, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108382.
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where the refusal is based on reasons other than those provided for by the rules, and where
the refusal has not been duly reasoned in accordance with those rules.6
It followed from the rulings in Canela Santiago v. Spain and Ullens de Schooten
and Rezabek that the European Court of Human Rights considered that a national
court’s refusal to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the
European Union could be viewed as arbitrary and therefore constitute an
infringement of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights if the
national court did not accompany its refusal by adequate reasons. This was
particularly relevant for Member State courts of last instance since these courts are
under an obligation to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice to the
European Union where the case before the Member State court raises a question
of interpretation of EU law and where the answer to this question is not obvious
(i.e., the question is not one of acte clair or acte éclairé).7
In the Dhahbi case, the question of a Member State court refusing to make a
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union and the right
to a fair trial came to a fore. The case concerned Mr Bouraoui Dhahbi; at the
material time, a Tunisian national who had entered Italy on a lawful residence and
work permit. In 2001, he applied for a family allowance, explaining that even
though he did not hold Italian nationality, as required by the relevant Italian
legislation, he was entitled to the allowance under the association agreement
between the European Union and Tunisia; known as the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement. The Italian district court hearing the case rejected Mr Dhahbi’s
application and so he lodged an appeal. As part of this appeal, he requested,
amongst other things, that the Italian Court of Appeal requested a preliminary
ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union on whether, under the
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, the Italian authorities had been justified in
refusing his request for a family allowance. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr
Dhahbi’s appeal leading him to lodge an appeal on points of law before the Italian
Court of Cassation, reiterating his request for a preliminary ruling to be sought
from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Also, this appeal was dismissed
without the Court of Cassation making any reference to Mr Dhahbi’s request for a
preliminary ruling – and not even a reference to the case law of the Court of
Justice of the European Union.8
6 Ibid. para. 59 (emphasis added).
7 If the case before the Member State court gives rise to a question on the validity of an EU legal act
and if the Member State court considers rendering the EU legal act invalid, the court is under an
obligation of making a preliminary reference irrespective of whether the Member State court rules in
the last instance or not, cf. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost, [1987] ECR 4199.
8 See para. 33 of the Dhahbi judgment.
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In March 2009, Mr Dhahbi lodged an application against the Italian Republic
with the European Court of Human Rights, which rendered its judgment in April
2014. In its assessment of the case, the European Court of Human Rights first
referred to its previous case law and the principles laid down therein regarding
preliminary references.9 With particular regard to Article 267(3) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it followed from this case law:
that national courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law,
and which refuse to request a preliminary ruling from the [Court of Justice of the
European Union] on a question raised before them concerning the interpretation of
European Union law, are required to give reasons for such refusal in the light of the
exceptions provided for by the case law of the [Court of Justice of the European Union].
They must therefore indicate the reasons why they have found that the question is
irrelevant, that the European Union law provision in question has already been interpreted
by the [Court of Justice of the European Union], or that the correct application of EU
law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt.10
Since no appeal had been possible against the ruling by the Italian Court of
Cassation, this court had been ‘under a duty to give reasons for its refusal to
request a preliminary ruling, in the light of the exceptions provided for by the case
law of the [Court of Justice of the European Union]’.11 The European Court
of Human Rights therefore went on to examine the Court of Cassation’s
judgment, but:
found no reference to the applicant’s request for a preliminary ruling to be sought or to
the reasons why the court considered that the question raised did not warrant referral to
the [Court of Justice of the European Union]. It is therefore not clear from the reasoning
of the impugned judgment whether that question was considered not to be relevant or to
relate to a provision which was clear or had already been interpreted by the [Court of
Justice of the European Union], or whether it was simply ignored . . . The [European
Court of Human Rights] observes in this connection that the reasoning of the Court of
Cassation contains no reference to the case law of the [Court of Justice of the European
Union].12
This finding was sufficient for the European Court of Human Rights to
conclude that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) of the European
Convention of Human Rights.13 The European Court of Human Rights also
9 The European Court of Human Rights particularly referred to its decision of 10 Apr. 2012 in
Vergauwen and Others v. Belgium (dec.), No. 4832/04, paras 89–90, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110889.
10 Paragraph 31 of the Dhahbi judgment.
11 Paragraph 32 of the Dhahbi judgment.
12 Paragraph 33 of the Dhahbi judgment.
13 Paragraph 34 of the Dhahbi judgment. Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights only
applies to civil rights and obligations as well as criminal charges (in a broad sense).This means that the
provision does not apply to all areas of EU law. However, Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental
NATIONAL COURTS OF LAST INSTANCE 247
found that the Italian State had violated Article 14 of the European Convention of
Human Rights taken in conjunction with Article 8 and on this basis awarded
damages to Mr Dhahbi.
It thus follows that whilst the European Convention on Human Rights does
not guarantee, as such, a right to have questions referred to the Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, refusal to make a preliminary
reference without providing adequate justification for this refusal can constitute a
breach of Article 6 of the Convention.14 According to the ruling in the Dhahbi
case, this is particularly likely to be the situation where a court of last instance
refuses to make a preliminary reference without adequately addressing the
applicant’s valid arguments in favour of making a reference.Arguably, the same will
be the situation where a national court of last instance (within the meaning of
Article 267 TFEU) makes a reference to the European Court of Justice, but this
reference is appealed to a higher court which either overturns the entire reference
or excludes one or more of the questions in the reference.15 However, the fact that
a court of last instance does not set out its reasons for refusing to make a
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union does not
necessarily mean that there will be an infringement of Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. In particular, the European Court of Human
Rights has previously held that refusal to make a preliminary reference without
giving reasons does not constitute an infringement of Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights if the applicant’s request for a preliminary reference
is insufficiently substantiated, and if the matter raises no fundamentally important
issue.16
The European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Dhahbi expressly refers to
the fact that the Italian Court of Cassation was a court of last instance so that it
had been ‘under a duty to give reasons for its refusal to request a preliminary
Rights of the European Union establishes a right to a fair trial which, in reality, reproduces Art. 6 of
the Convention, but which applies to all areas of EU law. Since Art. 47 of the Charter must be
interpreted in accordance with Art. 6 of the Convention, it appears fair to presume that the obligation
to provide reasons applies to all parts of EU law.
14 See in this regard also Herma v. Germany, Application No. 54193/07, decision on admissibility of
8 Dec. 2009, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-96483. The European
Court of Human Rights referred to Art. 267 TFEU in general – and not to Art. 267(3) TFEU
which concerns Member State courts of last instance. Thus, this seems to be in line with the
ruling in Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium, quoted above, where the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that refusal by a domestic court to grant a request for a preliminary
reference may, in certain circumstances, infringe the fairness of proceedings – even if that court is
not ruling in the last instance.
15 It is important to observe that such overturning of a national court’s decision to make a preliminary
reference by a superior national court may in itself contravene EU law. See further Morten Broberg &
Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice, 327–336 (2nd edn, Oxford
University Press 2014).
16 John v. Germany, Decision on admissibility of 13 Feb. 2007 (No. 15073/03).
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ruling, in the light of the exceptions provided for by the case law of the [Court of
Justice of the European Union]’. As observed above, in Ullens de Schooten and
Rezabek the European Court of Human Rights ruled that also courts that are not
courts of last instance may infringe Article 6(1) of the European Convention of
Human Rights if they refuse to make a preliminary reference to the Court of
Justice of the European Union.17 It is, however, unclear when a lower Member
State court may infringe Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights
by not making a preliminary reference. Perhaps one such situation may be where a
lower Member State court is under an obligation to make a preliminary reference,
but declines to do so.18
3 DAMAGES FOR FAILURETO REFER
The European Union is based on mutually loyal cooperation.This also applies to
the cooperation between the national courts of the Member States and the Court
of Justice of the European Union on the basis of Article 267 TFEU.The TFEU
does not specify any sanction for a national court’s failure to comply with the
obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling.
Refraining from making references cannot in itself lead to a duty to pay
damages under EU law. For instance, it does not make much sense to argue that a
national court shall be held liable for not making a preliminary reference if, in a
dispute as to whether national law contravenes EU law, the national court found
that there was such contravention.19 Nevertheless, where it later turns out that a
decision of a court of last instance was taken in violation of Article 267(3) TFEU,
this may be relevant in assessing whether the Member State in question must pay
damages for any loss that has been suffered due to the judgment.20 It may,
however, be quite a delicate task for a lower national court to assess whether a
superior court has incurred liability due to a sufficiently serious infringement of
EU law. Moreover, a problem of incapacity (bias) can arise if the matter is to be
brought before the court of last instance that is held to have committed the
17 See in this regard Case E-18/11 Irish Bank Resolution Corporation [2012] EFTA Court Report, 592,
para. 64.The EFTA Court expressly refers to the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Ullens
de Schooten and Rezabek.
18 This may particularly be the situation where a Member State court renders an EU legal act invalid
without first making a preliminary reference.
19 See similarly Negassi, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC
386 (Admin), para. 20.
20 See C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239; and Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR
I-5177. See also the ruling by the French Conseil d’État of 18 Jun. 2008 in Case No. 295831, Gestas,
and the ruling by the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) of 13 Oct. 2004 in case
A5/04, reported in 22e Rapport sur le contrôle de l’application du droit communautaire, COM(2005)570,
AnnexVI, 16.
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infringement.Thus, it may have been a delicate matter for the Swedish Supreme
Court when before this court a party argued that the Supreme Court had
committed a significant procedural error, as it had not made a reference for a
preliminary ruling before deciding a case.The Supreme Court denied that it had
been under an obligation to make such a reference in the actual case.21
In practice, it will probably be a rare occurrence that a judgment of a national
court will justify an award of compensation under EU law.22 Thus, according to
(then) Advocate General Jacobs, a Member State will really only be held liable
under the Court of Justice’s Köbler ruling in a case of bad faith.23 On that basis, it
has been suggested that in order to avoid such liability the national courts in their
reasoning should consider explaining why they consider a preliminary reference to
be superfluous.24 Nevertheless, in (at least) one situation a claimant has been
awarded compensation on the basis that a national court of last instance had failed
to make a preliminary reference; namely in the Swedish Flexlink case where the
Swedish Chancellor of Justice25 accepted to pay damages, inter alia on the basis that
the Swedish Administrative Supreme Court had failed to make a preliminary
reference.26 The Swedish Flexlink case may, however, be the exception to prove the
rule that in practice the Köbler ruling has led to practically no awards of damages.27
A Member State may not introduce laws that limit (not to mention exclude)
State liability regarding a Member State court’s failure to make preliminary
references to such extent that it amounts to imposing requirements that are stricter
than those laid down by the Court of Justice with regard to State liability for
21 See K.J. Dhunér, ‘Sweden’, IBA Legal Practice Division Antitrust Newsletter, 18 (2005), 27.
22 See the Order of 19 Jun. 2013 by the AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) in cases A
2/2013-6, A 3/2013-4. available at http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vfgh/JFT_20130619_13A
00002_00/JFT_20130619_13A00002_00.pdf (summarised in Reflets no 3, 2013 at 17–18), the
judgment by the UK Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Cooper v. HM Attorney General [2010]
EWCA Civ 464 (05 May 2010) available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/464
.html and Re Accountants Aptitude Tests (Case III ZR 294/03) [2006] 2 CMLR 55, where a claim
for compensation for failure to make a preliminary reference was rejected by the German
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court).
23 R. Crowe, Colloquium Report—The Preliminary Reference Procedure: Reflections based on Practical
Experiences of the Highest National Courts in Administrative Matters, ERA Forum 435, 444 (2004).
24 C.Naômé, Le Renvoi préjudiciel en droit européen (2nd edn, 2010), 49.
25 The Swedish Chancellor of Justice is a government appointee who supervises courts and
administrative organs.
26 Decision by the Swedish Chancelor of Justice of 6 Apr. 2009 in case 2409-08-40, available at http:
//www.jk.se/Beslut/Skadestandsarenden/2409-08-40.aspx. For comments on this decision, see
Frida-Louise Göransson, Rapport suédois in L’obligation de renvoi préjudiciel à la Cour de justice: une
obligation sanctionnée?, (Laurent Coutron (ed.), Larcier, Brussels 2014), 479–496 at 495.
27 Michal Bobek, Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants:The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice through the Eyes of
National Courts, in Judging Europe’s Judges:The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice,
216 (Maurice Adams, Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen & Gert Straetmans (eds), Hart Publishing
2013), observes that (at the time of his writing the text), to his knowledge, ‘not a single decision in
any of the Member States . . . would have . . . awarded damages following the Köbler guidance.’
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breaches of EU law.28 Moreover, the fact that EU law provides private parties with
the possibility of seeking damages in case of a Member State court’s failure to
make a preliminary reference does not mean that a private party must (also)
exhaust this possibility before applying to the European Court of Human Rights
for infringement of Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights.29
4 INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS FOR FAILURE TO REFER
It is incumbent on the Member States to ensure that their national courts fulfil the
obligation to make references under Article 267 TFEU. If they fail to do this, the
Commission can initiate infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.30 In
some instances, the Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against
Member States for failure to duly comply with their Treaty obligations where,
prior to the Commission’s initiation of proceedings, the matter has been before a
court of last instance without this court making a preliminary reference.31
However, given that the duty to refer is often set aside by the national courts, the
Commission’s practice may be qualified as reluctant.32
In one case the Commission has, however, addressed the issue directly.Thus, in
2004 it issued a letter of formal notice to Sweden for breach of Article 267
TFEU.33 According to the Commission, the Swedish authorities should have
adopted rules to ensure that the Swedish courts of last instance made references for
preliminary rulings in connection with decisions on whether a right of appeal
28 Case C-379/10, Commission v. Italy, Judgment of 24 Nov. 2011. It is likely that the matter will also be
dealt with in the forthcoming judgment in Case C-160/4, João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others
v. Estado português.
29 This the European Court of Human Right made clear in its judgment of 8 Apr. 2014, Dhahbi v. Italy,
Application no. 17120/09, at paras 23–25.
30 That the Commission (or other Member States) could institute infringement proceedings in cases
where national courts of a Member State failed to refer has been clear from an early point in time. For
instance, Jean de Richemont, L’intégration du droit communautaire dans l’ordre juridique interne – Article
177 du Traité de Rome, Librairie du Journal des Notaires et des Avocats, Paris 1975 points to this
possibility, but simultaneously observes that it is ‘quelque peu hypothétique …’ that this will occur.
31 This is the situation concerning Italy, Case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy [2003] ECR I-14637, and it
is also the situation concerning the Netherlands with regard to a decision by the Hoge Raad of 11 Jul.
2003 in X te Z (Duitsland) tegen Staatssecretaris van Financiën, AB Rechtspraak Bestuursrecht 2003, No
457, reported in 21e Rapport sur le contrôle de l’application du droit communautaire, COM(2004) 839,
AnnexVI, I-24–I-25.As for the Commission’s infringement action, see its press release of 9 Feb. 2004,
IP/04/178. In these instances, the Commission limited itself to criticizing the results which the
national courts arrived at regarding the substance of the cases, whereas the fact that the courts did not
refer in accordance with Art. 267(3)TFEU was not criticized.
32 See for example the case summary in Reflets no. 1, 2002, 17 regarding the Portuguese ruling by
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo, arrêt du 14.10.99, nº 31355, Antologia de Acórdãos do Supremo
Tribunal Administrativo e do Tribunal Central Administrativo, Ano III – nº 1, Setembro – Dezembro
1999, 13.
33 The Commission’s reasoned opinion has been made available to the public under the Swedish rules
on access to documents. See Commission docket No. 2003/2161, C(2004) 3899 of 13 Oct. 2004.
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should be granted. Next, the Commission argued that reasons should be given for
the refusal of the court of last instance to grant leave to appeal, so as to make it
possible to assess whether the requirements of Article 267(3) TFEU were fulfilled.
The latter argument – that a last instance court’s refusal to make a preliminary
reference must be duly substantiated – appears to have much in common with the
position taken by the European Court of Human Rights.34 On the basis of the
Commission’s letter of formal notice, the Swedish Parliament adopted a ‘Law on
certain provisions on preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice’.35 As a
consequence of this law, if one party argues that, in order to decide a case, it is
necessary to clarify the circumstances in which the Court of Justice of the
European Union has powers to make a preliminary ruling, in its judgment a
Swedish court must now give reasons why it has not made a reference for such
preliminary ruling if its judgment cannot be appealed against.36 As will thus be
apparent, the Swedish case first of all turned on last instance courts providing
adequate grounds for not making a preliminary reference when encouraged to do so
rather than on their refusal (as such) to make a preliminary reference.
5 FAILURE TO REFER,VALIDITY OF NATIONAL JUDGMENTS,
OBLIGATION TO REOPEN THE CASE FILE, AND OBLIGATION
TO RE-REFER
It may follow from national law that the setting aside of the obligation to make a
reference under Article 267(3) TFEU can in itself lead to the judgment or order in
question being invalid under national law. This, for example, is the case in
Germany, where the Bundesverfassungsgericht has on several occasions annulled
rulings of lower courts where the latter declined to make a preliminary reference
when acting as courts of last instance. According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
such refusal may amount to an infringement of the German constitutional
principle laid down in the Grundgesetz (the Basic Law) that no one may be
34 See s. 2 above.
35 Lag med vissa bestämmelser om förhandsavgörande från EG-domstolen, SFS 2006: 502.
36 M. Schmauch, Lack of Preliminary Rulings as an Infringement of Article 234 EC?, 11 Eur. L. Reptr, 445–54
(2005); and U. Bernitz, The Duty of Supreme Courts to Refer Cases to the CJ: The Commission’s Action
Against Sweden, in Swedish Studies in European Law, I, 37, 45–6 (N.Wahl & P. Cramér eds, 2 vols, 2006).
In some Member States, a somewhat similar duty to give reasons for refusal to refer has been
established by constitutional courts as is examined in Section 5 below. See for example the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) which has required reasons to be given where a
lower court has declined to make a preliminary reference in order to enable the Bundesverfassungsgericht
to adequately acquaint itself with the lower court’s reasons for declining to make such a reference so
that the Bundesverfassungsgericht can review the lower court’s refusal to make a preliminary reference;
see Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 9 Jan. 2001, 1 BvR 1036/99, reported in the Nineteenth Annual
Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law COM(2002) 324,AnnexVI, 39–41.
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deprived of the protection of the courts established by law.37 The examination by
the Bundesverfassungsgericht is limited to whether the application of Article 267
TFEU of the lower German court was manifestly unjustifiable, and in particular,
whether that court had totally violated its obligation to refer.38 Moreover, in order
for there to be such infringement, it must be clear that the case before the German
court gives rise to a question of the interpretation of EU law as opposed to a
question of its application to the particular factual situation facing the court.39
Similar approaches have been taken by the constitutional courts in the Czech
Republic (Ústavní soud40), in Slovakia (Ustavný súd41), in Austria
(Verfassungsgerichtshof42 ), in Slovenia (Ustavno sodišcˇe Republike Slovenije43) and in
Spain (Tribunal Constitucional44).45
In contrast, EU law itself does not contain a principle according to which a
breach of the obligation to refer laid down in Article 267(3) TFEU must lead to
the invalidity of the decision of the national court.This is so regardless of the fact
that Article 267 TFEU has a direct effect on national legal systems. Indeed, the
Court of Justice has recognized the importance of the principle of res judicata in
the legal systems of both the EU and its Member States.Thus, it has held that, in
order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound
administration of justice, it is important that judicial decisions are definitive and
can no longer be called into question after all rights of appeal have been exhausted
37 Bundesverfassungsgericht, order of 9 Jan. 2001, 1 BvR 1036/99, reported in Nineteenth Annual
Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, COM(2002) 324, Annex VI, 39–41;
Bundesverfassungsgericht, ruling of 29 Jul. 2004, 2 BvR 2248/03 (2004) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt JG 119
1411, reported in 23e Rapport sur le contrôle de l’application du droit communautaire, COM(2006) 416,
AnnexVI, I-5; and Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 30 Aug. 2010, 1BvR 1631/08.
38 Order of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 30 Jan. 2002, 1 BvR 1542/00 (2002) Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift, Heft 20, 1486, reported in Twentieth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law, COM(2003) 669,AnnexVI, 6–7.
39 F. Mayer, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, 399, 406 (2nd
edn,A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast eds, 2010) with further references.
40 Ústavní soud, Judgment of 8 Jan. 2009, II. ÚS 1009/08.
41 Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky, Order of 3 Jul. 2008, IV. ÚS 206/08-50, http://www.concourt.sk
/rozhod.do?urlpage=dokument&id_spisu=214397.
42 Verfassungsgerichthof, 30 Sep. 2003, B 614/01, Europäische Zeitung für Wirtschaftsrecht JG 15 (2004), 222,
reported in 21e Rapport sur le contrôle de l’application du droit communautaire, COM(2004) 839,AnnexVI,
I-7–I-8.
43 Ustavno sodišcˇe Republike Slovenije, décision du 21.11.13, Up-1056/11, summarized in Reflets no. 1,
2014, 42–43.
44 Cf. Daniel Sarmiento,Reinforcing the (domestic) Constitutional Protection of Primacy of EU Law, 875–892 at
882 CML Rev. (2013) with reference to, in particular, Judgment 78/2010 of the Full Court (Official
Gazette of 18 Nov. 2010).
45 Constrast with the decision of the Dutch Raad van State, afdeling bestuursrechtspraak, 16 Nov. 2005, X,
(2006) AB Rechtspraak Bestuursrecht AFL 14 124; and of the Dutch Centrale Raad van Beroep, 17 Nov.
2006, X/Raad van Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank (2007) AB Rechtspraak Bestuursrecht AFL 8 57,
according to which breach by a Dutch court of the obligation to refer a preliminary question under
Art. 267 TFEU does not, according to Dutch law, constitute a reason to revise a decision that has
become final.The same view has been taken in Danish law.
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or after the expiry of the time limits.46 Therefore, EU law does not require a
national court to abstain from applying domestic rules of procedure conferring
finality on a decision, even if to do so would enable the national court to remedy
an infringement of EU law.47 This principle applies both to situations where the
infringement consists of a national ruling that is contrary to EU law with regard to
substance and to infringements of a procedural nature, such as an omission to
respect Article 267(3)TFEU.
In two respects the Court of Justice has, however, qualified that finding. First,
the principle of res judicata plays a less prominent role when a national judgment
is at odds with a decision of an EU institution that has become final. In this
situation, not only must the finality of the national court’s decision be protected,
but also must that of the EU decision. Indeed, it is one thing for a national court
to make an incorrect decision, but quite another for it to render a decision that
encroaches on the sole competence of an EU institution.48
Second, in certain situations EU law imposes on an administrative body an
obligation to review a final administrative decision even though that decision has
been upheld by a court of last instance. There is no general obligation for the
administrative body to make such a review. However, where the administrative
decision in question has become final as a result of a judgment of a national court
ruling at final instance, and where, in the light of a subsequent decision given by
the Court of Justice, it becomes clear that this judgment is based on a
misinterpretation of EU law which was adopted without first obtaining a
preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice under Article 267(3) TFEU, the
national administrative body responsible for the case is obliged to exercise its
discretion to the extent possible under national law in order to reopen the
administrative decision, notwithstanding that the decision has received judicial
confirmation.49 The Court of Justice thus accepts that the matter is regulated by
national law and that it will be compatible with EU law that the administrative
decision is considered final where national law prevents the administration from
reopening the case. In this respect, EU law does not impose any time limit on how
late a party can ask for a reopening of the national proceedings. Consequently, the
matter must be settled in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy,
which means that Member States remain free to set reasonable time limits for
46 Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239.
47 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055; and Case C-234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585. See
also B.H. ter Kuile, To Refer or Not to Refer in Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, 381, 384
(D. Curtin &T.Heukels eds, 1994).
48 Case C-119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I-6199. See further A Biondi, ‘Case Note’, CML Rev, 45
(2008), 1459.
49 Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837.
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seeking remedies, in a manner consistent with the EU principles of effectiveness
and equivalence.50
The obligation for the relevant administrative body to reopen the case is not
dependent on whether the parties to the main proceedings relied on EU law
before the national court. This is because Article 267 TFEU institutes direct
cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
Member State courts by means of a procedure, which is independent of any
initiative by the parties. Indeed, the obligation to reopen the case arises even if the
Member State court did not consider the EU law issue at all, as long as, under the
relevant national procedural rules, the Member State court may raise of its own
motion a plea alleging infringement of EU provisions.51
Finally, it may also be considered whether a national court is under an
obligation to make a second reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of
Justice if the Member State court has already made one reference, but has received
an answer which does not take into account all relevant matters.The UK Supreme
Court was faced with this situation in Aimia Coalition Loyalty.52 One party argued
that the Supreme Court was obliged under EU law to make a further reference if
it found the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the first
reference to be incomplete or unsatisfactory. In the actual case, the Supreme Court
rejected the call for a new preliminary reference noting that in its judgment,
following receipt of the preliminary ruling, it had not questioned the Court of
Justice of the European Union’s ruling on any question of EU law. Rather, it had
proceeded on the basis of a more comprehensive account of the facts than the
Court of Justice had been afforded. Since, in the opinion of the UK Supreme
Court, no new question of EU law arose, any further reference was not necessary.
This, it is submitted, must be correct in law.
6 TYING THE KNOTS TOGETHER
As will be apparent from the above, where a Member State court fails to make a
preliminary reference even though it is under an obligation to do so, traditionally
it has been very unlikely that any legal consequences will flow from this. Thus,
whilst the Court of Justice has held that such failure may form the basis for
compensation, the present author is only aware of one single situation where such
damages have actually been paid to a private party. Likewise, the Commission (and,
50 Case C-2/06 Kempter [2008] ECR I-411 and the comment on the case by N. Fenger, Review of Final
Administrative Decisions Contrary to EU Law, 5 Eur. L. Rptr. 150, 155–156 (2008).
51 Case C-2/06 Kempter [2008] ECR I-411.
52 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Appellant) v. Aimia Coalition Loyalty UK Limited (formerly known as
Loyalty Management UK Limited) (Respondent) (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 42. Note that the reference was
originally made by the House of Lords.
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in principle also, the Member States) may bring up the matter via infringement
proceedings, but in practice the Commission has shown very considerable restraint
in prosecuting Member States on this basis.
In contrast, first of all the fact that several of the Member States’ constitutional
courts have required their inferior, national courts to duly observe the obligation
to make preliminary references when they rule as last instance courts, arguably, is
important for the enforcement of this obligation. Moreover, it is possible that
another important compliance incentive has been created through the European
Court of Human Rights’ 2014-ruling in the Dhahbi case.The fact that, following
this ruling, a court of last instance may be held to be in breach of Article 6(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights, if the national last instance court fails
to make a preliminary reference without giving sufficient grounds, may form an
important impetus towards better compliance.
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